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879 
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AFTER 
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA V. GARRETT: SHOULD THE 
STATES BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT? 
NICOLE S. RICHTER* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was signed into 
law in 1990 to establish a “comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”1  
Its provisions significantly expanded the legal rights of forty-three 
million Americans with physical or mental disabilities,2 provided 
protection from employment discrimination and guaranteed the 
provision of public services and accommodations.3  As enacted, the 
ADA applied to state actors, local actors, private employers and 
private businesses.4 
However, the ADA’s application to the states was called into 
doubt by the Supreme Court’s decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of 
Regents.5  In Kimel, the Court held that the Age Discrimination in 
 
 * J.D., Valparaiso University School of Law, 2001, magma cum laude. Ms. Richter is a 
law clerk for the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. 
 1. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213, 12101(b)(1) (1995).  
President Bush signed the ADA into law on July 26, 1990.  Randy Chapman, The Americans 
with Disabilities Act: Civil Rights for Persons with Disabilities, 19 COLO. LAW. 2233, 2233 (1990). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (finding that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more 
physical or mental disabilities”). 
 3. See Americans with Disabilities Act, Subchapter I (“Title I”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 
(1995). “No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability 
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, or other terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment.”  Id. § 12112(a); see also Americans with Disabilities 
Act, Subchapter II (“Title II”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (1995).  Title II provides that “no 
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by such entity.”  Id. § 12132. 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5).  Recipients of federal funds are also subject to the Rehabilitation 
Act, which prohibits discrimination against applicants or employees with disabilities.  See 
Barbara A. Lee, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: The 
Limitations of Rehabilitation Act Precedent, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 201, 205 (1993). 
 5. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).  In recent cases, the Court has invalidated other statutes as they 
apply to the states.  See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of Boerne v. 
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Employment Act (“ADEA”) was unconstitutional as applied to the 
states.6  The Court reasoned that the ADEA was not a valid exercise 
of Congress’s power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment (“Section Five”).7  Thus, it held that states are immune from 
lawsuits by private actors for money damages under the ADEA 
because Congress did not validly abrogate the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.8 
After Kimel, several legal commentators expressed concern that 
the ADA would suffer a similar fate9 and the federal courts of appeals 
were split on the issue.10  This speculation arose because the ADA 
and the ADEA are similar in many respects.11  For example, like age 
discrimination, disability discrimination is scrutinized under the 
deferential rational basis standard applied in Equal Protection 
review.12  However, there are also distinguishing factors.  Some 
commentators found that, unlike the ADEA, the ADA is supported 
by a “voluminous congressional record”13 and findings of discrimina-
tion by the states against the disabled.14 
Against this background, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in University of Alabama v. Garrett15 to resolve the issue.16  In Garrett, 
the Court invalidated the ADA as applied against the states by 
 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 6. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91. 
 7. Id.; see infra note 38 for the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 8. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.  The Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he Judicial power of 
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 9. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Major Change in Civil Rights Litigation, 36 TRIAL 94 
(2000); John W. Parry, Trend—The Supreme Court and the ADA: Sovereign Immunity Musical 
Chairs, 24 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 186 (2000); Susan E. Sutor & Susan 
Elizabeth Grant Hamilton, The Constitutional Status of the ADA: An Examination of Alsbrook 
v. City of Maumelle in Light of Recent Supreme Court Decisions Concerning the Eleventh 
Amendment, 19 REV. LITIG. 485 (2000). 
 10. See infra note 62. 
 11. See generally Keith R. Fentonmiller & Herbert Semmel, Where Age and Disability 
Discrimination Intersect: An Overview of the ADA for the ADEA Practioner, 10 GEO. MASON 
U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 227 (2000). 
 12. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985); Dandridge 
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485–86 (1970). 
 13. Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 95. 
 14. See infra Section III.B. 
 15. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).  The Supreme Court granted certiorari in two prior cases but both 
cases settled before the Court heard them.  See Fla. Dep’t of Corr. v. Dickson, 528 U.S. 1132 
(granting certiorari), cert. dismissed, 528 U.S. 1184 (2000); Alsbrook v. Arkansas, 528 U.S. 1146 
(granting certiorari), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000). 
 16. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). 
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holding that the Eleventh Amendment prevents private individuals 
from suing states in federal court for money damages.17  This holding 
has important implications for employees across the country.  Many 
federal antidiscrimination statutes that protect employee rights from 
state infringement are enforced through private litigation.18  Limita-
tions on this option could severely restrict the enforcement of these 
statutes altogether.19  Furthermore, the Court’s analysis of the ADA 
in Garrett failed to distinguish the ADA from the ADEA, leaving the 
future of Section Five litigation uncertain.20  With these concerns in 
mind, this Note argues that the ADA should apply to the states 
because it is a valid congressional abrogation of states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.  It will compare the Court’s findings in Kimel 
with the findings in Garrett to show that unlike the ADEA, the ADA 
is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under Section Five. 
Section I of this paper will discuss the ADEA and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kimel.21  It will show how the Court reached the 
conclusion that ADEA does not validly abrogate the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.  Section I will also discuss the ADA, focusing 
on the Title I provisions on employment discrimination to show why 
the ADA is vulnerable to constitutional challenge.  Next, Section II 
will discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Garrett, where the Court 
held that a private individual cannot sue a state in federal court for 
money damages under the ADA.  Section III will draw upon the 
reasoning in Kimel and Garrett to show that why the ADA is 
distinguishable from the ADEA and why the ADA should apply to 
the states.  Finally, this Note will conclude that the ADA validly 
abrogates the states’ sovereign immunity. 
 
 17. Id. at 356. 
 18. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal 
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 450–51 (2000) 
(finding that most federal antidiscrimination law is normally enforced through private law suits 
against the states); see also infra note 56. 
 19. Id. at 441–42.  After Garrett, a private plaintiff can still sue a state under the ADA in 
federal court for an injunction and may be able to sue a state under the ADA in state court.  Id. 
at 451 n.44. 
 20. Id. at 443–44 (stating that the Supreme Court’s Section Five jurisprudence could 
develop in different directions depending on how Kimel is interpreted). 
 21. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
The ADEA was enacted in 1967.  Under the ADEA it is unlaw-
ful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individ-
ual . . . because of such individual’s age.”22  It protects individuals who 
are forty years of age or older23 from age discrimination in the 
conditions and privileges of employment.24  The ADEA applies to 
private sector employers with twenty or more employees and the 
federal government.25  It was amended in 1974 to allow suits against 
the states and their subdivisions.26  However, the Supreme Court 
recently held in Kimel that a state cannot be sued under the ADEA.27 
In Kimel, the Eleventh Circuit consolidated three cases that al-
leged ADEA violations against state employers and, in a divided 
panel opinion, held that the ADEA did not validly abrogate the 
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.28 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to resolve the split in the federal courts of appeals 
of whether the ADEA validly abrogated the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.29  The Court began its opinion with a 
discussion of the Eleventh Amendment and found that it protects 
nonconsenting states from lawsuits in federal court.30  The Court 
stated that Congress may abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity and 
it articulated the following two-part test to determine if an abrogation 
is valid: (1) “whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to 
 
 22. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1995).  The ADEA was enacted to “promote employment of 
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in 
employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the 
impact of age on employment.”  Id. § 621(b). 
 23. Id. § 631(a).  The remedial provisions of the ADA were adopted from the FLSA.  H. 
Lane Dennard, Jr. & Kendall L. Kelly, Price Waterhouse: Alive and Well Under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 51 MERCER L. REV. 721, 727 (2000). 
 24. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). 
 25. Id. §§ 630(b)–(d), 631(b).  Under the ADEA, an employer has five affirmative defenses 
to a claim of age discrimination: (1) age is a bona fide occupation qualification that is reasonably 
necessary to the normal operations of the business; (2) the action is based on factors other than 
age; (3) the observation of the terms of a bona fide seniority system; (4) the observation of the 
terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan; and (5) discharge or discipline for good cause.  Id. § 
623(f). 
 26. Id. § 630(b). 
 27. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 28. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (1998).  
 29. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 72 (citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 525 U.S. 1121 (1999)). 
 30. Id.; see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 634–65 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida., 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). 
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abrogate [a state’s sovereign] immunity;” and (2) “if it did, whether 
Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.”31  
The Court proceeded by applying the test to the ADEA.32 
In applying the first prong of the test, the Court stated that Con-
gress may abrogate the states’ immunity from suit in federal court 
only by “making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of 
the statute.”33  The Court then analyzed Section 216(b) of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), a section of the ADEA, which states 
that employees can maintain actions for back pay “against any 
employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State Court of 
competent jurisdiction.”34  The Court found that this language, 
interpreted in conjunction with other sections of the ADEA, clearly 
expressed Congress’s intent to abrogate the states’ immunity.35 
Next, the Court analyzed the ADEA to determine whether it 
passed the second prong of the test: whether Congress acted pursuant 
to a valid grant of constitutional authority when it authorized suits 
against the states under the ADEA.36  The Court summarily dis-
missed the argument that Congress could derive its authority from the 
Commerce Clause.37  Turning to an analysis of Section Five, the Court 
found that Congress can abrogate the states’ immunity under this 
provision.38  The Court found that Section Five is an affirmative grant 
 
 31. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73 (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55). 
 32. Id.; see generally Tanya Smith, Current Event: Kimel v. Florida. Bd. of Regents 120 S. 
Ct. 631 (2000), 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 553 (2000). 
 33. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)). 
 34. Id. at 73–74; see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1995). 
 35. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 74.  The Court relied on several provisions of the ADEA and the 
FLSA in reaching this conclusion.  Id. at 73–74.  It began with 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1995), which 
states that “[t]he provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, 
remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211(b), 216, . . . and 217 of [the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938].”  Id. at 73.  The Court interpreted this section in light of 29 U.S.C. § 
216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which authorizes actions for back pay “against any 
employer . . . in any Federal or State Court of competent jurisdiction.”  Id. at 73–74.  The Court 
found that these provisions, when read as a whole, showed Congress’s intent to abrogate the 
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.  Id. at 74. 
 36. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80. 
 37. Id.  The Commerce Clause provides, “The Congress shall have the power to . . . 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3. 
 38. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80.  The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: 
 Section 1. . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . . . 
 Section 5.  The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, §§ 1, 5. 
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of power to Congress to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.39  The Court warned, however, that there are limitations 
on this power.  While Congress can enforce the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it cannot define what comprises a violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.40 
To determine whether Congress had overstepped its boundaries 
when it enacted the ADEA, the Court applied a congruence and 
proportionality test: whether there was a “congruence and propor-
tionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adopted to that end.”41  The Court began with an analysis of 
age discrimination to determine if the ADEA could pass the test.42  
The Court’s analysis relied heavily on the fact that age is not a suspect 
class and, thus, does not receive heightened scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.43  The Court held 
that age discrimination receives rational basis review, which allows 
states to discriminate on the basis of age if the discrimination is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.44  The Court reasoned 
that the ADEA’s broad restriction on age discrimination was a 
disproportionate remedy because it prohibited what would be 
otherwise constitutional conduct under the deferential rational basis 
standard.45 
The Court also examined the ADEA’s legislative history to de-
termine if the ADEA was “congruent and proportional.”46  It found 
that Congress did not identify a pattern of age discrimination by the 
states when the ADEA was enacted.47  The Court rejected the 
 
 39. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80–81. 
 40. Id.  The Court stated that the ultimate interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
substantive provisions is the “province” of the judicial branch.  Id. 
 41. Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).  Flores applied the 
standard to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and held the act to be inappropriate 
legislation under Section Five. 
 42. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83. 
 43. Id.  There are three levels of Equal Protection review: strict scrutiny, intermediate 
scrutiny, and rational basis scrutiny.  See Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis 
Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 595–96 (1999–2000). 
 44. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83. 
 45. Id.  The Court reasoned that age classifications were distinguishable from race or 
gender classifications because race and gender are “so seldom relevant to the achievement of 
any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect 
prejudice and antipathy.”  Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 
432, 440 (1985)). 
 46. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88.  The Court stated that “[d]ifficult and intractable problems often 
require powerful remedies, and we have never held that § 5 precludes Congress from enacting 
reasonably prophylactic legislation.”  Id. 
 47. Id. at 89.  The Court found that Congress’s extension of the ADEA to the states was 
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congressional findings of age discrimination, finding that they were 
little more than “isolated sentences clipped from floor debates and 
legislative reports.”48  The Court concluded that, absent a legislative 
finding that the states were unconstitutionally engaging in age 
discrimination, broad, prophylactic legislation was unnecessary and, 
thus, the ADEA was not a congruent remedy.49  Accordingly, the 
Court found that the ADEA was not a valid exercise of Congress’s 
power under Section Five and that its extension to the states in 1974 
was, therefore, unconstitutional.50  This decision threatened the 
validity of the ADA and continues to threaten many other civil rights 
statutes.51 
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to protect a “discrete and 
insular minority who . . . have been subjected to a history of purpose-
ful unequal treatment.”52  Title I of the ADA prohibits employment 
discrimination because of disability in job application procedures, 
hiring, advancement, discharge, compensation, training, and other 
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.53  To be covered by 
the Act, an individual must have a “physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities,” must 
have “record of such impairment,” or must be “regarded as having 
such an impairment.”54  Moreover, she must be qualified to perform 
 
“an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem.”  Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 91.  The Court held that Congress’s failure to document a pattern of significant 
discrimination by the states, while not dispositive, confirmed the Court’s finding that broad, 
prophylactic legislation was not necessary to remedy age discrimination.  Id. 
 50. Id. at 91.  The Court stated, however, that aggrieved employees could still seek redress 
under state age discrimination statutes.  Id. at 91–92. 
 51. See Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 95–96.  Other federal civil rights statutes, such as the 
Family and Medical Leave Act and the Equal Pay Act, are vulnerable to constitutional attack 
after Kimel.  Id.  While race and gender discrimination statutes will still be upheld, the Court 
considers these types of discrimination to be different because they receive a higher level of 
judicial scrutiny.  Id.  Thus, the Court accords Congress more power to remedy these forms of 
discrimination than it does for other types of discrimination that receive rational basis review.  
Id. 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1995). 
 53. Id. § 12112(a).  For a detailed discussion of prohibited employment practices, see 
Jeffrey Ivan Pasek et al., Compliance by the Private Sector with the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 62 PA. B. ASS’N. Q. 139, 144–45 (1991). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(A)–(C).  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) regulations define “substantially limits” as: 
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general 
population can perform; or 
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the essential functions of the job “with or without reasonable 
accommodation.”55 
Title I of the ADA applies to private employers with fifteen or 
more employees and federal and state governments.56  Congress 
specifically abrogated the states’ immunity under section 12202 of the 
ADA, declaring “[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in 
Federal or State court.”57  However, the ADA, as applied to the 
states, was subject to some of the same attacks that led to the 
invalidation of the ADEA in Kimel.  First, under Equal Protection 
analysis, disabled individuals are accorded only rational basis 
review.58  Traditional rational basis scrutiny does not afford much 
protection from unjust government action.59  Second, some legal 
commentators attacked the legislative history of the ADA, claiming 
that it did not contain adequate findings of state discrimination 
against the disabled.60  Thus, the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett to resolve the issue of whether the ADA validly abrogated 
the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.61 
 
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an 
individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, 
manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can 
perform that same major life activity. 
EEOC Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(j)(1) (1996).  Major life activities include “functions such as caring for oneself, 
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”  
Id.  § 1630.2(i). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).  Under the ADA, reasonable accommodations include, but are 
not limited to, making existing facilities accessible to and usable to individuals with disabilities, 
job restructuring, part-time work, modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, 
modification of equipment, and the provision of qualified readers or interpreters.  Id. § 
12111(9)(A),(B).  However, employers are not required to provide reasonable accommodations 
if they would cause an “undue hardship on the operation of the business.”  Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 56. Id. § 12111(5)(A).  The ADA is enforced through the provisions of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.  See id. § 12117.  Generally, an aggrieved individual must file a 
complaint with the EEOC.  Id. § 2000e–5(e).  If the EEOC issues a right to sue letter after 
reviewing the claim, the individual may proceed with a private civil action.  See Anne E. 
Beaumont, Note, This Estoppel Has Got to Stop: Judicial Estoppel and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1529, 1542 (1996). 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1995). 
 58. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985); Dandridge 
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485–86 (1970). 
 59. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term Forward: Implementing the 
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 79 (1997) (finding that judicial scrutiny under rational basis 
review is a “virtual rubber stamp”); FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 
(1993) (stating that rational basis review is the “paradigm of judicial restraint”). 
 60. See, e.g., infra note 79. 
 61. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
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II. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF 
THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA V. GARRETT 
After Kimel, several federal appellate courts wrote opinions on 
whether the ADA could be enforced against the states.62  However, 
the courts were split on the issue and thus left it unresolved.  The 
United States Supreme Court settled the issue in Board of Trustees of 
the University of Alabama v. Garrett,63 by ruling that the states are 
immune from private suits under the ADA for money damages in 
federal court.64 
A. The Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Garrett to determine 
whether employees of the State of Alabama could recover money 
damages in a suit against the State for a violation of Title I of the 
ADA.65  After a brief discussion of the relevant provisions in Title I of 
the ADA, the Court addressed the first question articulated in Kimel: 
whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the 
 
 62. The Tenth Circuit and the Second Circuit upheld the ADA as applied to the states 
after Kimel.  See Cisneros v. Wilson, 226 F.3d 1113, 1128 (10th Cir. 2000); Kilcullen v. N.Y. State 
Dep’t of Labor, 205 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2000).  Other courts also decided cases in favor of the ADA 
prior to Kimel.  See Garrett v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 193 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 
1999); Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1175 (9th Cir. 1999); Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 
311 (2d Cir. 1999); Amos v. Md. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 178 F.3d 212, 222–23 (4th Cir. 1999); 
Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 438 (5th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Commonwealth, 2000 WL 
15073 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Johnson v. State Tech. Ctr. at Memphis, 24 F. Supp. 2d 833, 842 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1998); Thrope v. State, 19 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821–22 (S.D. Ohio 1998); Lamb v. John 
Umstead Hosp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 498, 510 (E.D.N.C. 1998); Meekison v. Voinovich, 17 F. Supp. 2d 
725, 730 (S.D. Ohio 1998); Anderson v. Dep’t. of Pub. Welfare, 1 F. Supp. 2d 456, 468 (E.D. Pa. 
1998); Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 960 F. Supp. 1276, 1282–83 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
The Third and the Seventh Circuits found that the ADA was invalid after Kimel.  See 
Lavia v. Pennsylvania, 224 F.3d 190, 204–05 (3d Cir. 2000); Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 
F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2000).  Other jurisdictions also held that the ADA was not valid as 
applied to the states before Kimel.  See DeBose v. Nebraska, 186 F.3d 1087, 1088 (8th Cir. 1999); 
Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1009–10 (8th Cir. 1999); Brown v. N.C. Div. of 
Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698, 708 (4th Cir. 1999); Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 33 F. Supp. 2d 668, 
675 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1175 (S.D. Ohio 
1997). 
 63. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 64. Id. at 374. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion; Justices O’Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined.  Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined 
by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.  Id. at 376. 
 65. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). In Garrett, there were two plaintiff/respondents.  Id. at 356.  
Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, sued the University of Alabama in Birmingham because the 
university Hospital had removed her from her position as Director of Nursing after she took a 
substantial leave to treat breast cancer.  Id. at 362.  As a result, she was forced to take a lower-
paying job.  Id.  Milton Ash, a security officer, filed suit after the Alabama Department of 
Youth Services failed to honor his requests for reasonable accommodations.  Id. 
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states’ sovereign immunity.66  Without hesitation, the Court found 
that this requirement was met by section 12202 of the ADA.67  The 
Court then turned to the second question addressed in Kimel: 
whether Congress acted within its constitutional authority under 
Section Five when it abrogated the states’ immunity.68 
As it had in Kimel, the Court prefaced its analysis of the ADA 
with an acknowledgment that Congress’s power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment includes the power to remedy and to deter 
violations of the Amendment.69  It stated that in doing so, Congress 
may “prohibit[] a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that 
which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.”70  However, 
the Court also warned that it, not Congress, retains the power to 
define the substantive meaning of the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.71 
With these principles in place, the Court proceeded by identify-
ing the scope of the constitutional right at issue.72  Relying on City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,73 it held that disability 
discrimination receives rational basis scrutiny.74  The Court stated that 
a classification based upon disability does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if there is a rational 
relationship between the disparity of the treatment and a legitimate 
government purpose.75  Thus, it found that the states are not required 
to make special or reasonable accommodations for the disabled under 
the Equal Protection Clause as long as their actions are rational.76 
 
 66. Id. at 363–64; see also supra note 31. 
 67. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363–64; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text for the 
language of 42 U.S.C. § 12202. 
 68. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364.  The Court turned to Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because it found that the Eleventh Amendment prevented Congress from enacting 
the ADA under its Article I Commerce Clause power.  Id.  The Court’s recent limitations on 
Congress’s Section Five power has led some legal commentators to speculate that opponents of 
federal antidiscrimination laws will view Garrett as an invitation to challenge statutes enacted 
under Congress’s Spending Clause power.  See generally David G. Savage, The Next Federalism 
Frontier: After ADA Case, States’ Rights Activists May Test Congress’ Spending Power, A.B.A. 
J., Apr. 2001, at 30–32. 
 69. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365. 
 70. Id. (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 63 (2000)). 
 71. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365. 
 72. Id. 
 73. 473 U.S. 432 (1985); see infra notes 114–16 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Cleburne. 
 74. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365–66. 
 75. Id. at 367 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). 
 76. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366–67. 
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After establishing the permissible scope of disability discrimina-
tion, the Court examined the legislative history of the ADA to 
determine whether Congress identified a history and pattern of 
unconstitutional employment discrimination by the states against the 
disabled.77  While the Court acknowledged that Congress made 
general findings of discrimination against individuals with disabilities, 
it reasoned that these findings did not show a pattern of discrimina-
tion by the states.78  With regard to findings in the record that 
specifically involved the states, the Court found that these findings 
were “unexamined, anecdotal accounts of ‘adverse, disparate 
treatment by state officials.’”79  The Court also found that Congress’s 
failure to mention the states in its legislative findings indicated that it 
did not find a pattern of discrimination by the states.80  Thus, even 
though the ADA had a more developed legislative history with 
regard to the states than the ADEA had, the Court nonetheless found 
that this evidence was not enough.81 
Finally, the Court stated that even if the legislative history could 
be interpreted to show a pattern of disability discrimination by the 
states, the ADA failed to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment 
immunity because it was not “congruent and proportional.”82  The 
Court reasoned that the reasonable accommodations requirement of 
the ADA, which was designed to limit an employer’s liability, still 
requires state employers to go beyond what is constitutionally 
required by rational basis scrutiny.83  Under the reasonable accom-
modations standard, an employer can avoid liability by showing that 
the accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the operation 
of the business.84  However, the Court reasoned that, even with the 
undue hardship standard, the reasonable accommodation standard is 
unconstitutional because it “makes unlawful a range of alternate 
responses that would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing 
 
 77. Id.  The Court held that evidence of state violations does not include discrimination by 
local governments.  Id. at 368–69. 
 78. Id. at 370. 
 79. Id. at 370–71 (citations omitted).  In Erickson v. Board of Governors, the Seventh 
Circuit also found that the legislative history of the ADA did not include examples of 
“irrational” discrimination by the states.  207 F.3d 945, 951 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 80. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370–71. 
 81. Id. at 372–73; see also supra notes 46–48 (discussing the insufficient findings of age 
discrimination in the legislative history of the ADEA). 
 82. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370–74. 
 83. Id.  
 84. See supra note 55 for a discussion of reasonable accommodations. 
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an ‘undue burden’ upon the employer.”85  Based on these findings, the 
Court concluded that the ADA was not a valid abrogation of the 
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.86 
B. The Dissenting Opinion 
While the majority opinion found that the ADA could not apply 
to the states, four Justices, led by Justice Breyer, dissented, finding 
that the ADA is appropriate enforcement legislation.87  The dissent-
ing opinion began with an examination of the legislative history of the 
ADA.88  It found that Congress had compiled a “vast legislative 
record” indicating “‘massive, society-wide discrimination’” against 
the disabled.89  The dissent reasoned that these findings, although 
general, implicate state governments because they are part of general 
society.90 
Justice Breyer also found that there are roughly three hundred 
examples of state discrimination against disabled individuals in the 
legislative history of the ADA.91  He responded to the majority’s 
criticism that these findings were anecdotal evidence by stating that 
Congress is not required to make the same factual findings as a court 
of law.92  He reasoned that, unlike a court, Congress often relies upon 
general conclusions from anecdotal and opinion-based evidence.93  He 
 
 85. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372–74.  The Court also found that the undue hardship provision of 
the ADA goes beyond the boundaries of rational basis review because it shifts the burden to the 
employer to prove that it would suffer an undue hardship, while rational basis review requires 
the plaintiff to negate the reasonable basis for the employer’s decision.  Id.; see also supra note 
60. 
 86. Id. at 372–76.  The Court stated that to uphold the ADA as applied to the states “would 
allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court.”  Id. at 374.  
Justice Kennedy, who was joined by Justice O’Connor, wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize 
that he agreed with the majority’s finding only insofar as it held that a private individual could 
not sue an unconsenting state for money damages in federal court.  Id. at 374–76. 
 87. Id. at 376–78. 
 88. Id. at 377–82. 
 89. Id. at 377 (citations omitted).  In a dissenting opinion in Erickson v. Board of 
Governors, Judge Wood found that unlike the ADEA, the ADA was supported by legislative 
findings of discrimination by the states.  207 F.3d 945, 957 (7th Cir. 2000).  She observed that 
Congress made findings of discrimination in areas that are traditionally controlled by state and 
local governments, such as education, health services, and transportation.  Id. at 957–58. 
 90. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 377–79.  He reasoned that states are not immune from the 
“stereotypical assumptions” that Congress found to be present in society at large.  Id. 
 91. Id.  Appendix C to Justice Breyers’ dissenting opinion lists hundreds of findings of state 
discrimination against the disabled.  Id. at 390–423. 
 92. Id. at 379–83.  Justice Breyer stated “the Congress of the United States is not a lower 
court.”  Id. at 383.  He also noted that, traditionally, the Court has not required Congress to 
undertake an “extensive investigation” of evidence before it.  Id. at 380. 
 93. Id. 
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found that Congress’s fact-finding role is distinguishable from a 
court’s because Congress can “readily gather facts from across the 
Nation, assess the magnitude of a problem, and more easily find an 
appropriate remedy.”94 
After analyzing the legislative history of the ADA, Justice 
Breyer turned to the issue of congruence and proportionality.95  With 
regard to the reasonable accommodations requirement, he acknowl-
edged that the standard may require a state employer to take 
measures that go beyond the mandates of the Equal Protection 
Clause.96  However, he reasoned that this does not make the ADA 
invalid because, under the Court’s own reasoning, Congress is 
allowed to go beyond the minimum power granted by Section Five to 
regulate conduct that is constitutional.97  Under this principle, the 
reasonable accommodations provision is a valid exercise of congres-
sional power even though it may be broader than constitutionally 
necessary.98 
Justice Breyer also found the Court’s decision was contrary to 
the very purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.99  He stated that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted specifically to expand the power 
of the federal government and to limit the power of the states.100  
Overall, he found that the Court’s decision “saps § 5 of independent 
force” and concluded that the ADA is proper legislation under 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.101 
 
 94. Id. at 384.  Justice Breyer also noted that Congress is distinguishable from a court of 
law because acts of Congress directly reflect the will of the people.  Id.  Members of Congress 
can collect information directly from their constituents, which allows them to better understand 
the extent of discrimination by the states.  Id. 
 95. Id. at 385–86. 
 96. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 385–86. 
 97. Id. at 385–88. 
 98. Id.  In Erickson v. Board of Governors, Judge Wood also found that the ADA was not 
as broad as the ADEA in its mandates. 207 F.3d 945, 956–57 (7th Cir. 2000) (Wood, J., 
dissenting).  She found that, while the ADEA prohibits all employment discrimination against 
individuals forty and above, with few limited exceptions, the reasonable accommodation 
standard of the ADA is more narrowly tailored.  Id.  For the defenses to age discrimination, see 
supra note 25. 
 99. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 387–88. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 388–89. 
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III. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT VALIDLY 
ABROGATES THE STATES’ ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY 
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the 
Supreme Court held that the ADA does not validly abrogate the 
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.102  However, several federal 
appellate courts and four United States Supreme Court Justices 
disagreed.103  Given the impact that Garrett could have on federal 
antidiscrimination law, and given the Court’s failure to analyze the 
ADA with regard to the ADEA, it is important to determine whether 
the Court came to the correct conclusion concerning the ADA.104 
This Section will analyze the ADA by comparing it to the 
ADEA and show why private individuals should be able to bring suit 
against the states in federal court under the ADA.  It will apply the 
two-part test from Kimel and Garrett in the analysis.105  However, 
because all agree that Congress “clearly and unequivocally” intended 
to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity,106 this Note 
will focus on the second prong of the test and show why Congress 
acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority under 
Section Five. 
A. The ADA Is a Congruent and Proportional Response to 
Disability Discrimination 
Congress abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity 
under Section Five when it enacted the ADA.107  When Congress 
enacts legislation under its Section Five powers, the remedy must be 
“congruent and proportional” to the injury that it seeks to prevent.108  
Specifically, “[Congress] must identify conduct transgressing the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive provisions and must tailor its 
 
 102. Id. at 371–74. 
 103. See supra notes 62 and 87–101 and accompanying text. 
 104. See Post & Siegal, supra note 18, at 440–43, 450–51. 
 105. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. 
Florida., 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)).  For clarity, this Note will also address the issues in the order 
that the Court used in Kimel, even though a slightly different order was used in Garrett.  This is 
not necessarily, however, the order that the Court will use in future cases. 
 106. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363–64; Cisneros v. Wilson, 226 F.3d 1113, 1119 (2000) (stating 
that there is “no doubt” that Congress unequivocally expressed an intent to abrogate the states’ 
Eleventh Amendment immunity). 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1995) (stating “[i]t is the purpose of [the ADA] . . . to invoke 
the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth 
amendment”). 
 108. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.”109  
Under this standard, the following Section shows why the provisions 
of the ADA are a congruent and proportional response to disability 
discrimination. 
1. Disability Discrimination Receives Heightened Rational Basis 
Scrutiny 
In Garrett, the ADA suffered the same fate as the ADEA be-
cause age and disability discrimination both receive rational basis 
review.110  Under rational basis scrutiny, government action is 
constitutional as long there is a legitimate state interest behind it that 
is rationally related to the means chosen by the government.111  In 
particular, when the Supreme Court decided Garrett, it found that a 
wide range of discriminatory treatment toward the disabled is 
constitutional.112  However, the Supreme Court overlooked the fact 
that it analyzed disability discrimination under a higher level of 
rational basis review, referred to as second order rational basis 
scrutiny113 in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.114  Under 
 
 109. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
 110. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
 111. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 112. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (2001).  When discussing rational basis scrutiny as it applies to 
disability discrimination, the Court stated, “States are not required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions towards 
such individuals are rational.”  Id.  “They could quite hardheadedly—and perhaps 
hardheartedly—hold to job qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the 
disabled.”  Id. 
 113. See Erickson v Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945, 956–57 (7th Cir. 2000) (Wood, J., 
dissenting).  While Judge Wood acknowledged that age and disability discrimination receive 
rational basis scrutiny, she found that the Supreme Court analyzed disability discrimination 
under a heightened form of rational basis review in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).  Erickson, 207 F.3d at 956–57.  In Cleburne, the Court carefully 
analyzed an ordinance that discriminated against the mentally retarded, striking it down 
because it was based upon “irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.”  473 U.S. at 450.  
Judge Wood interpreted the Court’s use of “careful scrutiny” to indicate that the ADA was 
enacted to prohibit irrational discrimination against the disabled, dispelling the idea that like the 
ADEA, the ADA prohibits constitutional actions.  Erickson, 207 F.3d at 956; see also Sutor & 
Hamilton, supra note 9, at 501–02.  While Sutor and Hamilton point to the deference accorded 
the states under traditional rational basis review as a reason why the ADA is a disproportional 
measure, they fail to address the Court’s use of second order rational basis review in Cleburne.  
Id. 
 114. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).  In Cleburne, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the City of 
Cleburne violated the Equal Protection Clause when it denied a special use permit to a group 
home for the mentally retarded under a local zoning ordinance.  Id. at 447–55.  When analyzing 
the City’s basis for treating the group home differently, the Court departed from traditional 
rational basis review to conduct a “searching inquiry” into the City’s reasons.  Id. at 460.  In a 
dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall called this form of rational basis review “second order” 
rational basis review.  Id. at 458. 
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second order rational basis review, the Court takes an “active” rather 
than a passive role in evaluating the government’s offered reasons for 
the discrimination. The Court often looks beyond the government’s 
objective reasons to determine if they are a pretext for “irrational” 
action.115  In Cleburne, the Court applied second order rational basis 
scrutiny to a zoning ordinance that discriminated against the mentally 
retarded and found that it was unconstitutional because it was based, 
in part, on “irrational prejudice.”116 
Thus, the ADA is distinguishable from the ADEA.  Unlike age 
discrimination, disability discrimination receives more protection 
under second order rational basis review.117  This expands the amount 
of behavior that Congress can regulate under Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Therefore, unlike the ADEA, there is less 
potential for the ADA to regulate constitutional state practices. 
2. The ADA Targets Specific Employment Practices 
Furthermore, the ADA is distinguishable from the ADEA be-
cause it regulates specific employment practices.118  While the 
Supreme Court found that the mandates of the ADA, most specifi-
cally the reasonable accommodations requirement, were overbroad 
because they extended beyond the permissible scope of Fourteenth 
Amendment remedial measures,119 it failed to consider that Congress 
has broad powers to both remedy and deter violations of the Four-
teenth Amendment.120  In the dissenting opinion to Garrett, Justice 
 
 115. See Alfonso Madrid, Comment, Rational Basis Review Goes Back to the Dentist’s 
Chair: Can the Toothless Test of Heller v. Doe Keep Gays in the Military?, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 167, 171–72 (1994).  After Cleburne, the concept of second order rational basis 
review was weakened by the Court’s decision in Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993).  See Saphire, 
supra note 43, at 635.  However, the Court appeared to use a higher form of rational basis 
review in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), indicating that second order rational basis 
review is still viable. 
 116. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448. 
 117. Age discrimination is also distinguishable from disability discrimination because unlike 
those aged forty and above, the disabled are a “discrete and insular” minority who have been 
subjected to a history of discrimination.  See Erickson, 207 F.3d at 956 (Wood, J., dissenting).  In 
contrast, “all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, will experience [old age].”  Id. 
(quoting Kimmel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000)).  But see Sutor & Hamilton, 
supra note 9, at 499 (arguing that the ADA is an improper exercise of Congress’s power because 
disability discrimination receives rational basis review). 
 118. See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 310 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that “[t]he ADA 
targets particular practices—in this case, discrimination in employment—and provides a remedy 
following the time-tested model provided by the anti-employment discrimination provisions of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964”). 
 119. See Erickson, 207 F.3d at 951. 
 120. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365. 
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Breyer pointed out that the Court has repeatedly confirmed that 
Congress is allowed to prohibit conduct that is constitutional as long 
as it does not redefine the substance of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.121 
As Judge Wood found in her dissenting opinion in Erickson v. 
Board of Governors,122 the ADA does not regulate all employment 
discrimination against the disabled.123  The ADA requires an 
employer to make reasonable accommodations for a disabled 
employee only if such accommodations would not impose an undue 
burden on the employer.124  Therefore, if an employer is faced with 
significant difficulty or expense in implementing reasonable accom-
modations, the ADA does not require them to do so.125 
Thus, in contrast to the ADEA, the ADA does not prohibit all, 
or almost all, discrimination against a given classification.  It merely 
prevents an employer from refusing to offer reasonable accommoda-
tions where they would be feasible.126  While this standard may 
prohibit some constitutional conduct, under the Court’s reasoning 
Congress is allowed to regulate some constitutional behavior.127  
Therefore, the reasonableness standard for accommodations validly 
enforces the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Its provisions do not go so far as to redefine the meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause because the reasonableness standard and the 
undue hardship provision limit the amount of state conduct that 
Congress can regulate. 
Therefore, the ADA is congruent and proportional; it regulates 
only the most severe state discrimination against the disabled.  If an 
accommodation would create an undue burden on an employer, it can 
rationally deny employment to a disabled individual, even under 
second order rational basis scrutiny.  Unlike the ADEA, the provi-
sions of the ADA do not expand or redefine constitutional protection 
for the disabled.  They merely prevent an employer from engaging in 
irrational discrimination such as the failure to provide reasonable 
accommodations to an otherwise qualified employee.  However, as 
 
 121. See id. at 974–75. 
 122. 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 123. Id. at 957. 
 124. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  It is estimated that when employers make 
reasonable accommodations for disabled employees the average cost is less than one hundred 
dollars.  Margaret Grahm Tebo, Which Way for the ADA?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2000, at 58. 
 125. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1995). 
 126. Id.; see also id. § 12111–12112. 
 127. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365. 
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the Court found in Kimel, the inquiry does not necessarily end with a 
finding on the constitutionality of the regulated conduct; the Court 
can ask whether Congress enacted reasonably prophylactic legislation 
by examining the legislative record.128 
B. The ADA Is Supported by Significant Legislative Findings of 
Disability Discrimination by the States 
The ADA is also distinguishable from the ADEA because an 
examination of the ADA’s legislative record reveals that the ADA is 
a proportionate response to the problem of disability discrimination.  
In Kimel, the Court found that “Congress never identified any 
pattern of age discrimination by the states.”129  In contrast, in Garrett 
Justice Breyer’s dissent found that Congress engaged in an extensive 
investigation of disability discrimination before enacting the ADA.130  
It commissioned two reports from the National Council on the 
Handicapped, an independent federal agency, to discuss the suffi-
ciency of existing federal laws.131  Congress also held thirteen hearings 
on the ADA,132 sponsored sixty-three public forums across the 
country,133 and reviewed evidence from almost five thousand 
individuals on the issue of disability discrimination.134 
With regard to the states, these resources uncovered pervasive 
discrimination against the disabled by state and local governments.135  
The finding included discrimination in areas under state control, such 
as employment,136 education,137 voting and political access,138 public 
 
 128. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 129. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 130. See Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 377–78 (2001); see also Erickson, 207 F.3d at 958 (Wood, J., 
dissenting) (finding that Congress compiled an “immense legislative record” when it decided 
whether to enact the ADA); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a). 
 131. See Brief for the United States at 9, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 
356 (2001) (No. 99-1240). 
 132. See Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 
TEMP. L. REV. 393, 393 n.1 (1991) (listing the hearings).  Cook documented the history of 
discrimination against the disabled by the states.  Id. at 399–407.  He pointed out that “virtually 
every state” had laws that segregated people with disabilities, finding that they were a “blight on 
mankind.”  Id. at 400, 402. 
 133. See Brief for the United States at 11, Garrett. 
 134. Id. at 12. 
 135. See infra notes 136–42.  But see Reply Brief at 4, Garrett (No. 99-1240) (stating that 
there are no findings that the states engaged in unconstitutional disability discrimination). 
 136. See infra notes 141–42 and accompanying text. 
 137. See Brief for United States at 20–22, Garrett (No. 99-1240) (citing approximately 
twenty examples of state discrimination in education from at least six different states).  For 
example, the Brief cited a finding that Ryan White, a child with AIDS, was denied access to a 
public school because local parents feared that he would “infect” other children, when in fact his 
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transportation,139 and law enforcement.140  Specifically, Congress made 
significant findings in the area of employment discrimination.  For 
example, one witness told Congress that he “was told by the Essex 
Junction School System that they were not hiring me because I used a 
wheelchair.  I suspected it in other situations, but in that one, they 
actually said that this was the reason.”141  Another witness, who 
suffered from arthritis, reported that she was “denied a job, not 
because she could not do the work but because ‘college trustees 
[thought] normal students shouldn’t see her.’”142 
These, along with other findings, distinguish the ADA from the 
ADEA.  Contrary to the Supreme Court’s finding that the Congres-
sional findings “fall short of even suggesting [a] pattern of unconstitu-
tional discrimination,”143 Congress identified numerous instances 
where the states have irrationally discriminated against the dis-
abled.144  Furthermore, as Justice Breyer found, Congress is not a 
 
disease was not contagious through casual contact.  See 136 CONG. REC. H2480 (daily ed. May 
17, 1990) (statement of Rep. McDermott).  Another example is a report of a student in 
Vermont who had to attend class with students two grade levels behind him because he could 
not climb a staircase that led to upper-level classrooms.  See Education for All Handicapped 
Children 1973–1974: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. 
on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 384 (1973) (statement of Peter Hickey). 
 138. See Brief of United States at 22–25, Garrett (No. 99-1240) (citing approximately thirty-
one examples, from at least twelve different states, in which the states denied disabled 
individuals equal access to the voting and political process).  As an illustration, the Brief cited a 
finding that a deaf individual was told that he or she could not vote because “you have to be 
able to hear your voice” to vote.  See Equal Access to Voting for Elderly and Disabled Persons: 
Hearings Before the Task Force on Elections of the House Comm. on House Admin., 98th Cong., 
1st Sess. 94 (1984) (Equal Access to Voting Hearings). 
 139. See Brief for United States at 25, Garrett (No. 99-1240) (citing approximately seven 
instances of state discrimination against the disabled in the provision of public transportation 
from at least three different states).  For example, one report found that busses often pass 
individuals in wheelchairs, with walkers, or with crutches because the drivers do not want to 
take the time to pick them up.  See 2 LEG. HIST. 1097 (statement of Bill Dorfer). 
 140. See Brief for United States at 26–27, Garrett (No. 99-1240) (citing approximately 
seventeen examples where law enforcement officers discriminated against individuals with 
disabilities from at least six different states).  In one case, the police would not investigate a rape 
allegation by a blind woman because she was not capable of making a visual identification.  See 
N.M. 1081; see also Brief for Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 15–16, 
Garrett (No. 99-1240) (finding that “individuals with handicaps are all too often excluded from 
schools and educational programs, barred from employment or are underemployed because of 
archaic laws, denied access to transportation, buildings and housing . . .and are discriminated 
against by public laws which frequently exclude citizens with handicaps”). 
 141. See Brief for United States at 18, Garrett (No. 99-1240) (quoting 2 LEG. HIST. 1076) 
(statement of John Nelson). 
 142. See Brief for United States at 18, Garrett (No. 99-1240) (quoting S. REP. No. 116, at 7 
(1989)). 
 143. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366. 
 144. Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Kimel v. Fla. 
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89–91 (2000)).  In Erickson, Judge Wood said that “[c]ombining the 
explicit coverage of the sectors in which the states are the principal actors, with the deliberate 
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court of law.145  It has broad fact-finding powers and its findings are 
not held to the same evidentiary standard as a court of law.146  Under 
this standard, Congress acted reasonably when it abrogated the states’ 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.  Thus, unlike the ADEA, the 
provisions of the ADA are simply a response to pervasive and 
documented discrimination by the states. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the broad implications that the decision in Board of 
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett will have on other 
federal antidiscrimination statutes, the Court should have found that 
the ADA is a congruent and proportional response to disability 
discrimination by the states. The ADA is distinguishable from the 
ADEA because Congress appropriately tailored the remedies of the 
ADA to include only reasonable measures against employment 
discrimination.  Furthermore, Congress supported the ADA with 
extensive findings regarding discrimination by the states against the 
disabled.  Thus, private individuals should be able to bring suit for 
money damages against a state employer in federal court under the 
ADA. 
 
decision of Congress to make the states subject to the statute, and finally with the enormous 
legislative record documenting the depth of the problem of disability discrimination, I find the 
second part of the Kimel approach satisfied by the ADA.”  Erickson, 207 F.3d at 959 (Wood, J., 
dissenting). 
 145. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 377–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 381–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
